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Abstract   
The vast majority of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in developing countries are located 
in industrial clusters, and the majority of such clusters have yet to see their growth take off.  
The performance of MSE clusters is especially low in Sub-Saharan Africa. While existing 
studies often attribute the poor performance to factors outside firms, problems within firms 
are seldom scrutinized.  In fact, entrepreneurs in these clusters are unfamiliar with standard 
business practices. Based on a randomized experiment in Ghana, this study demonstrates that 
basic-level management training improves business practices and performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are widely recognized as a major source of 
employment and income in developing countries.  If they grow in size, they would 
contribute more to economic growth and poverty reduction.  In reality, however, their 
productivity remains low and their sizes remain small (e.g., Mead and Liedholm, 1998, 
Tybout, 2000).  While their low performances may be attributed to the unfavorable 
circumstances surrounding them, recent empirical studies have identified problems within 
firms, especially problems regarding management (e.g., Bloom et al., 2010; Bruhn, Karlan, 
and Schoar, 2010; Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka, 2011).   
Management has been increasingly recognized as a major determinant of productivity 
in the recent economics literature (e.g., Syverson, 2011).  Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 
2010) collected data on management practices from a number of medium-sized firms in 
developed and fast-growing countries to establish a close association between management 
and productivity.  Using unique data, Ichinowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Lazear 
(2000), and Bertrand and Schoar (2003), among others, show that human resource 
management and top executives’ management style are important determinants of 
productivity in the U.S.   
To establish causality more directly, Karlan and Valdivia (2011), Drexler, Fischer, and 
Schoar (2010), and Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010) have carried out randomized control 
trials in which management training or a consulting service is provided for MSEs in their 
study sites in Latin America.  The most clear-cut result of these experiments is that 
rudimentary, as opposed to standard, management training improves business practices.  
This indicates that many MSE entrepreneurs in developing countries know little about 
management.  A somewhat discouraging result of the experiments, however, is that the 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-06
 2 
impacts of the management training and consulting on sales and profits are economically 
large but are statistically weak. 
This paper attempts to extend this line of research by using experimental data gathered 
before and after a management training program offered to MSEs in Africa.  In our view, 
MSE entrepreneurs’ lack of management knowledge has a great deal to do with their 
locational choices.  Although the existing studies do not specify where their subjects are 
located, we suspect that they are located in industrial clusters because the vast majority of 
MSEs in developing countries are located in such clusters, defined as the geographic 
concentration of a number of firms producing similar and related products.  Industrial 
clusters are spontaneously formed in a wide range of countries and sectors because of the 
benefits of localization economies (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).  As documented in recent 
case studies, localization economies in clusters allow new entrants with little managerial and 
financial capital to start businesses (e.g., Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Ruan and Zhang, 2009; 
Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006, 2011).  Moreover, like human capital, managerial capital may 
well be underinvested in, and many entrepreneurs may be unaware of the value of acquiring 
managerial capital (Bloom et al., 2010).  Thus, it is not surprising that MSE entrepreneurs 
lack basic knowledge and skills regarding management.  As a case study by Iddrisu et al. 
(2011) indicates, however, it is likely that many such entrepreneurs are now willing to learn 
about management because the profitability of their businesses have been declining due to 
intensified competition with an increasing number of new entrants producing similar 
products and the massive import of cheap products from newly industrialized economies. 
This study provides an elementary management training program for MSE 
entrepreneurs in an industrial cluster.  It examines whether the entrepreneurs are willing to 
learn about management and to what extent the training improves the performance of their 
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businesses.  We find that the vast majority of the entrepreneurs invited to the training 
program attended the training sessions in earnest, and that many adopted the management 
practices taught in the program.  None of the participants were closed down, whereas nearly 
ten percent of the enterprises in the control group were closed down after the training.  The 
difference in survival rate between the treatment and control groups is statistically significant.  
As with the existing studies, however, we find that the estimated average effects of the 
training on accounting-based measures of performance, such as sales and profits, are 
economically large but statistically insignificant.  In the experiment carried out by Bruhn, 
Karlan, and Schoar (2010), the provision of consulting services to MSEs was expected to 
improve the clients’ business performances, but statistically, the effects were only marginally 
significant.  The authors attribute this result to noisy data and the relatively small sample 
size.  In the case of our experiment, the training increased the percentage of participants 
adopting the recommended practices from near zero to 50 percent; however, the rest of the 
participants did not even attempt to adopt the practices.  Such variation among the 
participants seems to be a cause of the statistically weak effect of the training on the 
participants’ business performance.  The results of analysis suggest that such variation can 
be reduced if participants are taught how to motivate workers to adopt new practices.   
The next section reviews the studies of industrial clusters in developing countries and 
clarifies the questions to be addressed in this paper.  Section 3 describes the sampling 
scheme and the training design, and Section 4 presents the basic statistics.  After specifying 
the regression models, Section 5 reports the estimation results and discusses the directions of 
possible estimation biases due to attrition, spillovers, market stealing, and psychological 
effects.  Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications for future research.  
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2. Location and management of MSEs 
Casual observations suggest that the vast majority of MSEs in developing countries 
are located in industrial clusters including small clusters of furniture makers along roadsides, 
garment markets in which tailors are producing and selling clothes, and the like.  The 
benefits of localization economies, which attract MSEs to industrial clusters, include 
favorable access to market information, low transaction costs due to easy monitoring and the 
effective functioning of the reputation mechanism among firms located near each other, and 
the resulting development of the division of labor among manufacturers and between 
manufacturers and traders (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006). 
Case studies of industrial clusters in Asia, Latin America, and Africa suggest that 
clusters in different industries in different countries follow the same development path until 
they reach a certain phase and then the path bifurcates (e.g., Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; 
Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006, 2011).  An industry is born in a developing country when a 
cheap imitated substitute of an imported product wins popularity in a local market.  An 
industrial cluster is formed as an increasing number of new firms begin producing imitated 
products near the pioneer’s location.  As new firms enter the cluster, the division of labor is 
developed in the cluster.  Each firm specializes in a narrow segment of a value chain, with 
only a narrow range of skills and a small initial investment (Ruan and Zhang, 2009).   
Thus, a cluster attracts a swarm of new entrants, and the increased scale of the cluster 
reinforces the localization economies.  Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, 2011) refer to this phase 
of industrial development as the quantity expansion phase since the expansion of the cluster 
is based on the new entry of imitators without any qualitative improvement in the products 
or the production processes.  In this phase, owners do not keep records of transactions or 
inventory (e.g., de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2009), and they fail to separate financing 
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for their businesses with that of their own households.  Even casual observers notice that in 
such disorganized workshops, owners and workers waste time looking for necessary tools 
and materials on a daily basis.  Although these owners are not managers in the real sense of 
the term, they are still able to maintain their small businesses.  Because every transaction 
and activity takes place in full view of the owners, small businesses are easy to operate.   
The increase in the supply of homogeneous low-quality products due to the 
proliferation of imitative firms will sooner or later saturate the local market, resulting in the 
decline of the product price and the profitability of producing such low-quality products.   
The declining profitability induces entrepreneurs to attempt product quality improvements.  
According to case studies, successful quality improvement involves the establishment of 
brand names, the development of new marketing channels and the introduction of a standard 
management system with stricter control of product quality and work effort, and the 
establishment of trust-based long-term subcontracting relationships with parts-suppliers 
(Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006).  For such multifaceted improvements, it is important to gain 
knowledge about technology and management from outside the cluster and to take advantage 
of the pool of human resources within the cluster, such as traders, engineers, and parts-
suppliers.  With the progression of quality improvement, successful firms become larger 
and the total number of firms decreases through exits and mergers of inefficient firms. 
If a cluster fails in quality improvement, however, profitability will continue to decline 
until new entry ceases.  Firms will continue to produce the same low-quality products, and 
their ways of running businesses will remain far from systematic and efficient.  When local 
economies were closed to international trade, firms could survive without difficulty.  In the 
era of globalization, however, firms face competition from foreign producers who constantly 
improve their products or reduce costs.  The literature on industrial clusters reports several 
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cases in which negative external shocks turned out to be blessings in disguise in the sense 
that they triggered multifaceted improvements within clusters.
1
  In many other clusters, 
however, negative external shocks have worsened the downward trend in profitability, and 
firms are struggling to survive (e.g., Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Kennedy, 1999; 
McCormick, 1999; Akoten and Otsuka, 2007). 
Thus, a cluster may either enter the quality improvement phase or stay as a survival 
cluster.  A major hypothesis is that among the important determinants of a cluster’s fate is 
the management knowledge of the entrepreneurs in the cluster.  This study examines to 
what extent basic management training can improve the business practices and performance 
of firms in a survival cluster.  The evaluation of the full effect of the training will require 
several rounds of follow-up surveys.  At this stage of research where we have completed 
only the first post-training survey, we can only analyze the short-run effects.   
According to the literature on technology diffusion, the same technology is adopted by 
different adopters several years apart, and a major explanation for such a phenomenon is that 
different adopters put different values on the new technology (e.g., Hall and Khan 2003).  
Likewise, management training participants will be heterogeneous in both incentive and in 
the ability to put the knowledge they gain from the training into practice.  Moreover, their 
business performance will be subject to idiosyncratic shocks.  Thus, we expect that the 
effect of the training on performance will vary considerably among the participants.   
If management training proves to be useful for at least some participants, the question 
arises as to whether the benefit is large enough to justify the cost of the training.  For this 
reason, we focus on the short-run private benefit because the benefits and losses for non-
participants, neighbors, and consumers (i.e., social welfare) are practically impossible to 
capture in the data.  In short, this paper examines the effects of a managerial training 
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program on the participating entrepreneurs’ business practices and performance and 
compares the cost and private benefit of such a program. 
 
3. Surveys and training program 
Our study site is Suame Magazine, located in Kumasi, the second largest city in Ghana.  
Kumasi is a junction of artery roads connecting major coastal cities and major inland cities 
including Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso.
2
  Suame Magazine is known in 
West Africa as a large cluster of garage mechanics, but it is also a cluster of metalwork 
enterprises producing a variety of metal products, such as bolts and nuts, corn mill machines, 
threshing machines, and cash safes.
3
  The garage cluster has had a long period of 
quantitative expansion because the demand for car repair services has increased dramatically.  
As the garage cluster expanded, scrap metal became increasingly available, helping the 
expansion of the metalwork cluster.   
We conducted a survey of metalwork entrepreneurs in early 2005.  At that time, most 
masters, whether garage mechanics or metalwork entrepreneurs, were members of the 
Suame branch of the Ghana National Association of Garages (GNAG).  As shown in Table 
1, the number of members in 2003 exceeded 10,000, of which more than 1,000 were 
metalwork entrepreneurs.  The number of metalwork entrepreneurs does not seem to have 
increased since then.  As will be shown in Table 3 below, the profitability in this cluster 
began decreasing clearly in the early 2000s.  The metalwork cluster in Suame Magazine 
was a typical survival cluster except for the extraordinarily large size of the annexed garage 
cluster.  For the survey, we selected 167 metalwork entrepreneurs randomly from the 
GNAG member list.  Their data on educational and occupational backgrounds, production 
and costs, marketing channels, and investments were gathered by visiting each of them 
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(Iddrisu, 2007).   
The training program was implemented for three weeks from the middle of November, 
2007.
4
  The program consisted of three modules of classroom training: Module 1 on 
entrepreneurship, business planning, and marketing; Module 2 on production management 
and quality management; and Module 3 on record keeping and costing.
5
  Each module 
lasted for five weekdays, 2.5 hours per day in the evening.  The venue was the Suame 
Branch of the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) in the cluster, so that busy 
entrepreneurs could attend the classes after work.   
The instructors were three Ghanaian consultants with extensive experience.  They 
were selected through an international competitive tender, based both on the cost and quality 
of their submitted proposal, following the World Bank’s procurement guidelines.
6
  They 
spoke the local language, Twi, and thus communicated smoothly with the participants.  
Modules 1 and 3 were based on the textbooks of the improve-your-business (IYB) and start-
your-business (SYB) training program developed by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO).  IYB and SYB are implemented as standard business training modules in many 
developing countries.  Our instructors emphasized the importance of identifying good 
customers, separating business and household finances, keeping records, and other very 
basic practices.  Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2010) find that a “simplified, rule-of-thumb” 
training of accounting has significant impacts on business results.  The third module of our 
program involved exactly such basic training on record keeping.  The training hours were 
allocated almost evenly to the instructors’ lectures and to group work and debates.  
The contents of Module 2 were not as standard as those of Modules 1 and 3, but they 
were as easy to understand.  This module began with an explanation of the concepts of 
productivity and quality, which was followed by discussions regarding the difference 
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between value adding and non-value adding activities, and the workplace housekeeping 
method called 5S.
7
 The instructor also discussed an inexpensive approach to improving 
productivity and quality called KAIZEN.    
Before selecting the entrepreneurs to invite to the training program, we were advised 
by an adult education expert that the number of participants in a classroom should be 60 or 
less.  Since we had already committed ourselves to inviting seven entrepreneurs who had 
assisted in our study, we selected 53 other entrepreneurs randomly from the sample of the 
baseline survey and trained them together in the same classroom.  The seven pre-selected 
participants will be treated with special attention in the analysis below. 
When we invited the 60 entrepreneurs to the training program, we explained that the 
program was not related to any financial assistance to them.  Nonetheless, many of the 
participants expected to receive low-interest credits, according to our informants.  They 
were disappointed to learn that such credits would not be extended to them, but they 
continued to attend class and became increasingly enthusiastic about learning more about 
management toward the end of the program.
8
 
The training program cost about 40,000 US dollars, which included the hiring cost of 
the instructors, the cost of teaching material production, the cost of the instructors’ travel 
from Accra to Kumasi and accommodation expenses, and the cost of renting the venue.  
The cost of selecting the instructors and the researchers’ travel cost were not included in this 
amount.  The venue cost was very low because we were able to use the NVTI classroom for 
an insignificant amount.  If the total cost is divided by the number of the participants, the 
training cost per person will be about 740 US dollars for the 15 days.   
A follow-up survey was conducted in November 2008, i.e., about a year after the 
training sessions were completed.  We attempted to visit the 167 firms in the sample of the 
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baseline survey and obtained data of 139 firms.  We found ten firms had closed down.  An 
encouraging fact is that none of the participants had closed down, which suggests a favorable 
effect of the training on enterprise survival.  We could not obtain data of 18 other sample 
firms.  One of them refused to cooperate with our survey.  We could meet neither the 
entrepreneurs nor their workers at the remaining 17 firms and could not be sure whether 
these firms were temporarily or permanently closed.
9
  These 18 attritors are also in the 
control group; that is, they had not been invited to the training program.  We will discuss 
possible estimation biases due to the attrition in Section 5. 
During the training program, we learned that most of the foundry men in both the 
treatment and control groups had received technical training from an aid agency in the same 
year.  Another problem was that after our training program, several entrepreneurs in our 
sample were evicted from a prime location which they had occupied without permission.  
Needless to say, the eviction had a severe impact on their businesses.  In the analysis below, 
we use both the larger sample consisting of 139 firms (plus ten closed-down firms) and the 
smaller sample consisting of 113 firms (plus six closed-down firms) other than the foundries, 
the evicted firms, and the pre-selected participants.   
      
4. Basic statistics 
In the smaller sample, the treatment group consists of 47 entrepreneurs and the control 
group consists of 66 entrepreneurs, as shown in Table 2.  By the treatment group, we mean 
those entrepreneurs invited to attend the training program.  In the treatment group, there are 
six refusers, who did not attend the training at all or only attended the first two days.  The 
remaining members in the treatment group are called participants.  The participants 
attended 14.1 days on average, and the majority recorded perfect attendance.  The high 
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rates of participation and attendance are consistent with our hypothesis that entrepreneurs in 
survival clusters are willing to learn
 
management practices. 
The treatment group and the control group share similar background attributes.  A 
typical entrepreneur is male, about 45 years old, from the Ashanti region, where the cluster is 
located, went to school for a little more than 10 years, learned the skill of the trade as an 
apprentice from a master of either fabrication or machining for three to four years, and has 
been operating his own business for nearly 14 years.  Fabricators are basically welders, 
whereas machinists are basically lathe turners.  Many workshops have both fabricators and 
machinists because their activities are complementary.  We classify the entrepreneurs in the 
smaller sample into these two types—fabricators and machinists—based on the original line 
of work that they were engaged in when they started their businesses.   
Table 2 shows that the refusers tended to be older than the participants.  Older 
entrepreneurs may have had greater time costs or lower expected benefits from the training 
than younger entrepreneurs.  Another characteristic of the refusers is that none of them are 
from outside the Ashanti region.  Local inhabitants would have greater involvement in 
extended family functions, community functions, and sideline businesses than those from 
other regions.  If this was the case, their opportunity costs would be higher.   
Table 3 reports the data on the adoption of recommended practices and three 
accounting-based indicators of business performance.  The data on the situations in 2000 
and 2002 are recall data collected in 2004.  The left side of the table shows the percentages 
of the entrepreneurs who visited customers periodically, kept records, and routinely analyzed 
the records in the specified year.  Visiting customers is not a common activity in this cluster, 
and the majority of the sample firms do not keep records.  Even if records are kept, they are 
seldom reviewed or analyzed.  The data on the adoption of production management 
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practices are not shown in the table because we could not obtain useful data.  This is 
because few non-participants understood our questions about production management. 
After the training, the percentage of firms in the control group keeping records 
increased by only 6 percentage points whereas the increase was 36 points in the treatment 
group.  Similarly, the adoption rates of the other two practices (i.e., keeping and analyzing 
records) increased much more in the treatment group than in the control group.  These 
results indicate that the training had strong impacts on the adoption of the recommended 
practices.  Another noteworthy point is that well over one third of the treatment group firms 
did not adopt the recommended practices.  The variance of each adoption variable within 
the treatment group increased after the training because the variance of the dummy variable 
increases as the mean approaches 0.5. 
The right side of Table 3 reports the data on annual sales revenue, value added, and 
gross profit by treatment status.  Gross profit here is defined as sales revenue minus 
material cost and labor cost.  Because the majority of firms did not keep records, we 
estimated these financial variables by asking each entrepreneur about the number of pieces 
sold and their prices by product type, material inputs and material prices, payments to 
subcontractors, and payments to workers and apprentices.  We checked that the estimate of 
gross profit was consistent with the entrepreneur’s earnings, investment, living expenses, 
purchase of durable goods, and so on.
10
 Written records, whenever available, were used 
deliberately, taking into account that each entrepreneur might have his own unique concept 
of costs and that his calculation might be incorrect.   
The trend of declining profitability is visible in Table 3.  Some respondents said 
definitely that this trend was set by the proliferation of competitors within the cluster, and 
that it was being worsened by massive imports of similar products from Asia and increasing 
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competition with similar clusters in the country.  Decreases in sales, and gross profits after 
the training were somewhat smaller for the treatment group than for the control group.  
These differences in the mean values are small but suggest that the training had favorable 
effects. 
The training seems to have impacts on equipment investment as well.  Note that 
Table 4 shows investment amounts in GHS, whereas Table 3 shows the sales, value added, 
and gross profit in 1,000 GHS, which was almost equivalent to 1,000 US dollars in 2008.  
The median investment amount in each year is zero, i.e., the majority in each year 
undertakes no equipment investment.  Although the average of the investments by the 
fabricator control group is relatively high in 2008, the magnitude is not impressive for 
equipment investment even by the standard in the cluster.  Sizable investments were 
undertaken by three machinist participants, who purchased machine tools.  As a result, the 
difference in investment between the treatment and control groups of machinists became 
significant at the 5 percent level after the training, as shown in Table 4.  Another sizable 
investment was undertaken by a fabricator participant, who relocated his workshop to a 
better conditioned site outside the cluster and installed new machines.  This is not reflected 
in the data because it took place a few months after the follow-up survey.  
 
5. Estimation 
5-1 Specification 
In this section, we estimate the average effects of the training on the participants’ 
survival, their business performances, and their adoption of recommended business practices.  
Let Y1i be the outcome that firm i will have if its entrepreneur participates in the training, and 
let Y0i be the outcome that he will have if he does not receive the training.  If Di is a dummy 
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variable that is equal to 1 for participants and 0 for non-participants, the average effect of the 
training on the participants may be given by E(Y1i|Di = 1) – E(Y0i|Di = 1) or E(Y1i – Y0i|Di = 1).  
By definition, E(Y0i|Di = 1) is hypothetical and unobservable, but it will be equal to an 
observable value, E(Y0i|Di = 0), if the participants are randomly selected.  Note, however, 
that although invitation was randomized, participation was not, and that the invited 
participants decided themselves whether to participate.   
To cope with self-selection biases and to take advantage of the randomization in the 
invitation, we resort to the framework of the local average treatment effect (LATE).  In this 
framework, a key role is played by the dummy variable Zi that is 1 if entrepreneur i was 
invited to the training and 0 otherwise.  Obviously, D and Z are closely associated because 
only the invited entrepreneurs could participate in the training.  Let D1i and D0i be the 
values of Di when Zi = 1 and when Zi = 0, respectively.  LATE is the average treatment 
effect on those whose treatment status is affected by random assignment (i.e., invitation in 
our case) and defined by  
 
 LATE = E[Y1i – Y0i |D1i ≠ D0i].           (1) 
 
Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that if Y1i, Y0i, D1i, and D0i, are independent of Zi and if D1i 
≥ D0i, for all i (monotonicity),  
 
 LATE = Cov(Yi, Zi) / Cov(Di, Zi).          (2) 
 
where Yi is the outcome actually observed for firm i.   
Since all the participants in our program were invited, D0i is 0 and D1i is either 0 or 1.  
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Those invited entrepreneurs with D1i = 0 are the refusers and those with D1i = 1 are the 
participants.  Thus, D1i ≠ D0i in equation (1) means that entrepreneur i will participate in the 
training if invited, and LATE in our case is equivalent to E[Y1i – Y0i|Di = 1], i.e., the average 
training effect on the participants.  It is easy to show that the monotonicity condition is 
satisfied in our case.  Equation (2) implies that LATE can be estimated as coefficient β in a 
regression model, Yi = α + βDi + εi, by using Zi as an instrumental variable (IV).  Following 
the lead of Frison and Pocock (1992) and McKenzie (2011), we use the Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) regression, which may be written 
 
YiA =α +βDi + θYiB + XiBγ + εi,                       (3) 
 
where YiA is the post-training outcome, YiB is the average of the outcomes in the pre-training 
years, namely 2000, 2002, and 2004, and XiB is a vector of the entrepreneur’s background 
attributes measured in year 2004, which are almost all time invariant.  The use of random 
assignment, Zi, as an IV allows us to obtain a consistent estimate of β.  
 
5-2. Estimation results 
In the estimation of equation (3), the first-stage regression has Di on the left-hand side 
and the instrument, Zi, and the controls XiB on the right-hand side.  The qualitative results of 
the first-stage regression are the same regardless of whether the larger or smaller sample is 
used and can be summarized briefly.  Since Di and Zi are closely correlated, Zi has a highly 
significant coefficient.  Consistent with Table 2, the age variable and the Ashanti dummy 
variable have negative and significant coefficients.  No other variables have significant 
coefficients in the first-stage regressions.   
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-06
 16 
The second-stage regression results are reported in Tables 5 to 8.  Table 5 shows the 
results concerning enterprise survival.  After the training program, two foundry men, four 
fabricators, and four machinists stopped operation and exited the cluster.  It is remarkable 
that they all belonged to the control group and that none of the training participants stopped 
operation.  This means that we cannot employ the probit model.  Instead, we employ the 
linear probability model to check the statistical significance of the coefficient on the 
instrumented Di.  In this model, YiA is a dummy variable equal to unity if the firm was 
operating at the follow-up survey and zero otherwise, and the lagged dependent variable YiB 
on the right-hand side of equation (3) is unity for all i. 
The results of such a two-stage regression are qualitatively the same regardless of 
whether the larger or the smaller sample is used.  Table 5 reports the results obtained by 
using the smaller sample.  The estimated effect is positive and significant at the one percent 
level in column (i) and at the five percent level in columns (ii) to (v).  Participation in the 
training program increases the probability of survival by 8 or 9 percentage points.  
Although not reported in the table, the estimate of the survival effect is greater and has a 
higher significance level if the larger sample is used. 
Columns (ii) to (v) include as controls the dummy variables indicating whether the 
firm had adopted the recommended business practices even before the training.  The 
estimation results indicate that the firms that had kept records of transactions even before the 
training program were more likely to survive than other firms.  Columns (iii) to (v) include 
one of the accounting-based indicators of business performance before the training program, 
but none of these indicators have significant coefficients.  In every column, the 
entrepreneur’s schooling has a positive and marginally significant coefficient.  A possible 
interpretation is that schooling increases outside opportunities for entrepreneurs, even though 
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we do not have any evidence supporting this interpretation. 
Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the training on the participants’ adoption of the 
recommended practices and their performance indicators.  These estimates are obtained by 
using the larger sample without taking into account the closing down and other attrition 
cases.  The dependent variables in the first three columns are the dummies indicating 
whether the recommended practices were adopted.  In the last three columns, the dependent 
variables are sales, value added, and gross profit, which are not logarithmic but in 1,000 
GHS units.  The estimated average effects of the training on the participants’ adoption of 
the three recommended practices are positive and highly significant as shown in the first 
three columns.  Note, however, that these effects are not homogeneous because one third to 
half of the participants did not adopt these practices as shown in Table 3.   
The estimated coefficients on the instrumented Di are positive but insignificant as 
shown in the last three columns.  These estimated coefficients are not large compared with 
the large standard errors, but their economic magnitudes are not small.  For example, this 
coefficient in the gross profit equation is the estimate of E(π1i – π0i|Di = 1), which can be 
viewed as the pecuniary private benefit of the training per participant in the first year 
following the training.  The hypothetical gross profit π0i can be regarded as the opportunity 
cost.  If the effect is felt in the years ahead, E(π1i – π0i|Di = 1) is only a part of the private 
benefit.  In contrast, the training cost of 740 USD per participant is a one-time cost.  The 
estimated one-year benefit of 4,230 GHS is very large compared with this cost.  However, 
this estimate is statistically insignificant. 
The larger sample, which is used in producing Table 6, includes the entrepreneurs who 
attended another training program which included similar training contents and those evicted 
entrepreneurs whose businesses suffered great damage.  Although these entrepreneurs are 
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more or less evenly distributed across the treatment and control groups, their inclusion in the 
sample may lead to an underestimate of the effect of the training on business performance.  
Suppose that participation in our training program and that in another training program are 
equally effective in improving business performance.  Suppose further that these two 
programs are largely substitutes rather than complements, and, hence, the effect of 
participation in both programs on performance is not much stronger than the effect of 
participation in either one.  If this is the case, the inclusion of the entrepreneurs who 
participated in another program in the sample will weaken the estimated effect of our 
training program.  Similarly, if the eviction nullified the effects of the training, we would 
underestimate the effects by including the evicted entrepreneurs in the sample. 
If such is the case, the exclusion of the entrepreneurs who participated in another 
training program and the evicted entrepreneurs will lead to greater estimates of the training 
effects.  We thus used the smaller sample to estimate the same model as above and report 
the estimated effects of the training on the adoption of the recommended practices and 
performance indicators in the first row of Table 7.  Except for column (iii), the coefficient 
on the instrumented Di is greater in Table 7 than in Table 6.  While the two tables do not 
differ much in the estimated effects on the adoption of the recommended practices, they do 
in the estimated effects on the accounting-based performance indicators.  The estimated 
effects on value added and gross profit are statistically significant in Table 7.  The estimated 
coefficient on gross profit indicates that the private benefit of the training in the first year is 
13,400 GHS, which is about 18 times the training cost.   
While the effects on sales revenue and gross profit are insignificant and significant, 
respectively, in Table 7, Berge et al. (2011) find that a similar business training program 
increased the sales revenue but not the profit margin.  A possible explanation why our 
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training program had a stronger effect on gross profit than on sales revenue is that our 
training put emphasis on improvements in production management, especially the reduction 
of waste.  The training program studied by Berge et al. did not have a module on 
production management.  Another possible explanation is that while all the participants in 
our training program were manufacturers, the majority of the participants in the training 
program studied by Berge et al. were engaged in commerce.  
 
5-3. Heterogeneous effects 
How heterogeneous are the treatment effects?  We examined the heterogeneous 
effects by inserting interaction terms of times the variables representing the entrepreneur’s 
background attributes, such as age and education, in turn.  We find a significant difference 
in treatment effects between different groups only in the following three cases (see the 
second panel of Table 7).  When Di is interacted with the machinist dummy, the treatment 
effect on record keeping turns out to be weaker for the machinists than for the fabricators, 
even though the difference in the treatment effect is only marginally significant.  Probably, 
this result reflects the fact that record keeping was much more common among the 
machinists than among the fabricators.  When Di is interacted with age, it is found that the 
treatment effect on the record analysis outcome is slightly weaker for older entrepreneurs 
than for younger entrepreneurs.  This is probably because less experienced young 
entrepreneurs had not noticed the usefulness of analyzing transaction records. 
Clearer heterogeneous effects are found when the Di dummy variable is interacted with 
the years of schooling.  More highly educated participants were more likely to begin 
visiting customers and keeping and analyzing records.  Probably, educated participants 
would tend to begin keeping the names and mobile phone numbers of customers so that they 
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could visit the customers, and their math skills would help them keep and analyze 
transaction records.  However, the effects of the training on the accounting-based measures 
of business performance are lower for more educated participants.  Since more highly 
educated entrepreneurs tend to employ and train a greater number of workers and 
apprentices, these results suggest that an improvement in business performance is more 
difficult for larger firms than for smaller firms.  Although the training program introduced 
the participants to KAIZEN, which provides useful clues as to how workers can be 
motivated to adopt new practices, there was not enough time to explain such details.   
 
5-4. Attrition bias and bounds tests 
Attrition is one of the sources of potential estimation bias.  As noted above, ten 
sample firms closed down.  Among the other 18 attritors, one refused to cooperate with our 
survey, 11 were found operating when we visited them a year later, and six were missing 
even on our revisit.  Thus, the 11 firms were temporarily closed, and the six firms might be 
permanently closed.  Although these 18 attritors seem to have performed poorly, we 
examined what if these attritors were the most successful firms or if they were slightly more 
successful than the average, by using the bounding approach of Karlan and Valdivia (2011) 
to construct lower bounds for the treatment effect.   
The lower (upper) bound for the treatment effect shown in the first panel entitled 
Approach I in Table 8 is developed by assuming that the attritors’ outcomes were equal to 
the outcome of the most (least) successful firm in the observed control group.  It is 
remarkable that even the lower bounds on the treatment effects on record keeping and record 
analysis are positive and significant.  While the lower bounds on the treatment effects on 
the accounting-based measures of business performance are negative and insignificant.  In 
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Approaches II and III, the lower (and upper bounds) are computed under more modest 
assumptions that the attritors’ outcomes are the mean plus (and minus) 0.25 standard 
deviations and 0.1 standard deviations, respectively, of the observed control distribution.  In 
these approaches, even the lower bounds on the treatment effects on the adoption of the 
recommended practices are highly significant, and those on business performance are 
positive and marginally significant. 
 
5-6. Spillovers and market stealing 
In industrial clusters, knowledge spills over quickly.  According to our respondents, 
the training participants talked to other entrepreneurs about their impressions of the program, 
the instructors, and the outline of the training contents.  Knowledge spillovers would reduce 
the estimate of the training impacts as spillovers improve the business results of the control 
group, which in turn reduces Cov(Yi, Zi) in equation (2). 
As Bloom et al. (2007) point out, firms’ productivity improvement can affect other 
firms’ performance through market stealing as well as spillovers.  The first module of our 
training program encouraged the participants to be proactive in getting new customers.  A 
few participants told us that soon after the training, they began issuing invoices and receipts 
on which their mobile phone numbers were printed, and they believed that the invoices and 
receipts had doubled their sales compared with the previous year.  Their sales may have 
increased at the cost of other firms’ sales.  The market-stealing effect would overstate the 
training effects on the participants by worsening the business results of the control group.  
The impacts of spillovers and market stealing may or may not be strong.  Knowledge 
does not affect business results if it is not put into practice.  As shown in Table 3, the 
control group’s adoption rates in 2008 increased only slightly in contrast to the significant 
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increases among the treatment group in the same year.  Furthermore, not all the adopters 
would successfully assimilate the practices that they adopted.  Market stealing by a 
participant would worsen the business results of the other participants as well as the non-
participants, and these negative effects could cancel each other out.  The assessment of the 
impacts of spillovers and market stealing is deferred to future follow-up surveys. 
 
5-7. Psychological effects 
The increases in the control group’s adoption rates in 2008 may also be attributed to a 
psychological effect.  It is only human to show that one is doing well, even if this involves 
some pretense.  In the follow-up survey, some entrepreneurs may have exaggerated how 
well their firms were doing.  Moreover, the control group may have been loath to admit that 
they had failed to benefit from the training program.  It is not difficult to imagine that some 
of them exaggerated not just the adoption of the recommended practices but also their 
business results.  The follow-up survey data on the participants may have a similar problem.  
The participants may have been tempted to please us by exaggerating their benefits from the 
training program.  Such a problem may not be very serious in our case, however, since we 
visited the entrepreneurs at their workshops to conduct the survey, observed their products, 
and asked them to show us their business records, if they kept any.  
 
6. Conclusion 
As in the rest of the world, there are a number of industrial clusters in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but unlike clusters in other regions, these clusters have not yet achieved successful 
industrial development.  Their low performances have been attributed exclusively to factors 
outside firms, such as poor infrastructure and unfavorable governance.  By contrast, 
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problems within firms have seldom been scrutinized.  Based on a randomized controlled 
experiment in Ghana, this study demonstrates that entrepreneurs in a survival cluster are 
unfamiliar with the business practices which are standard in developed countries and some 
other developing countries.  It also indicates that participation in a rudimentary 
management training program improves the business practices and results of the participants 
with considerably varying degrees of success.  Although we should be cautious about 
generalization, these results are highly consistent with the results of earlier studies in Latin 
America.  It seems safe to conclude that entrepreneurs in developing countries can improve 
the productivity of their MSEs by learning management techniques.   
In earlier studies, the estimated training effects were economically large but 
statistically insignificant or only marginally significant.  Our results suggest that such weak 
estimates come from large variations among the participants in terms of their own inherent 
abilities and education levels and their workers abilities and motivation.  Probably, 
entrepreneurs’ managerial abilities are more difficult to improve than workers’ skills.  
Unlike vocational training, a management training program may improve the managerial 
abilities of only a few participants.  Nonetheless, it may be worth providing from the social 
welfare point of view.  This is because the quality improvement phase of industrial 
development is led by a few innovative entrepreneurs, and their success contributes to the 
overall social welfare through increasing awareness of the value of training as well as 
imitation by many other entrepreneurs.   
The results of this paper warrant considerable further research.  The longer-term 
training effects should be examined in future.  Our conjecture is that only a small number 
of participants will continue to improve their business performance based on the knowledge 
acquired in the training.  Another direction to explore is to provide advanced training.  By 
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providing elementary training, we have confirmed that entrepreneurs in the survival phase 
know little about management.  Advanced training will allow us to explore what factors 
help industrial clusters enter the quality improvement phase successfully. 
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Notes 
1. Examples include a surgical instrument cluster in Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999), a garment 
cluster in India (Tewari, 1999), and shoe clusters in Brazil (Schmitz, 1999), and Ethiopia 
(Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka, 2009). 
2. This area used to be the site of an army depot called Magazine during the colonial times. 
The name Magazine has been adopted by similar engineering clusters in the northern part 
of Ghana, whereas those in the southern part are called Kokompes. 
3. McCormick (1999) provides a bird’s-eye view of this cluster. 
4. The training program was funded by the Government of Japan through its Policy and 
Human Resource Development (PHRD) trust fund at the World Bank. 
5. The program was modeled on the “Business Course” provided by the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) in eight transition economies; Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Laos, 
Mongolia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam. 
6. The lead consultant was an SYB master trainer.  The instructor in charge of Module 2 
had received training in metalwork in Japan and was familiar with KAIZEN. 
7. 5S is named after the corresponding Japanese words whose Romanized forms begin with 
the letter s.  Their English counterparts also begin with s; that is, sorting, setting in order, 
systematic cleaning, systematizing, and self-discipline. 
8. Including the pre-selected participants, the majority of the participants recorded perfect 
attendance.  At the end of the program, the participants evaluated the program as 
follows: 98 percent found the program very important to their business, 94 percent had 
learnt very much, and 96 percent were satisfied with the program. 
9. When we revisited the study site a year later, we found that 11 of these 17 firms had been 
temporarily closed at the time of our survey and then resumed the same businesses.  
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10. We usually began by asking about the price of each product and the output in a busy 
month and in a slack month, together with a question about when the workshop was 
busiest.  If the respondent was unsure, we changed tack and asked, for example, how 
many units of a product were produced from one unit of a material, and how often and 
how many units of the material were purchased in a busy month and in a slack month. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Enterprise Population in the Suame Magazine Cluster by Sector 
 Garages Metalworking 
enterprises 
Others Total 
2000 4,958 807 2,204 7,969 
2002 6,222 990 2,618 9,830 
2003 7,847 1139 2,844 11,830 
Notes. These estimates are taken from the database of the Suame branch of the Ghana National 
Association of Garages (GNAG).  Estimates do not include ancillary trades such as restaurants and 
telecommunication shops.  “Others” include truck body builders, pot makers, sign writers, and some 
types of welders. 
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 Table 2.  Characteristics of the sample entrepreneurs 
 Treatment group Control 
 Total Participants Refusers Group 
No. of entrepreneurs 47 41 6 66 
Male (%) 100 100 100 100 
Age (as of 2004) 45.4 44.2 53.6 44.8 
From Ashanti (%) 78.7 75.6 100 86.4 
Years of schooling 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.3 
Apprentice training (%) 91.5 92.7 83.3 87.9 
Years of operation (as of 2004) 13.4 12.2 21.6 14.2 
Machinists (%) 55.3 56.1 50.0 68.2 
Notes. Treatment group refers to the group of entrepreneurs who were invited to the training program. 
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Table 3.  Percentages of firms adopting recommended practices 
and their business outcomes by treatment status, 2000 - 2008 
Treatment Control   Treatment Control  
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Visiting customers (%)   Sales revenues (1,000 GHS)  
2000 19.2 12.2  2000 83.9 93.0 
2002 19.2 13.7  2002 72.1 66.5 
2004 20.3 13.7  2004 60.5 50.0 
2008 51.1 21.2  2008 47.6 30.4 
       
Keeping business records (%)   Value added (1,000 GHS)  
2000 23.4 19.7  2000 53.9 67.3 
2002 23.4 19.7  2002 42.0 46.9 
2004 27.7 24.3  2004 37.2 32.3 
2008 63.8 30.3  2008 30.7 31.1 
       
Analyzing business records (%)  Gross profit (1,000 GHS)  
2000 14.9 12.1  2000 44.6 49.2 
2002 14.9 15.2  2002 34.1 34.3 
2004 21.3 15.2  2004 30.0 23.9 
2008 55.3 18.2  2008 27.2 17.0 
Note: Sales revenue, value added, and gross profit are in terms of the 2008 constant GHS, obtained 
by using the GDP deflator taken from IMF’s World Economic Outlook. 
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Table 4. Real equipment investment before and after the training program (GHS) 
 Fabricators Machinists 
 Treatment 
(1) 
Control 
(2) 
p-value  
(3) 
Treatment 
 (4) 
Control 
(5) 
p-value   
(6) 
2006 154.8 40.5 0.276 197.3 487.2 0.386 
2007 108.1 39.5 0.263 258.1 299.6 0.201 
2008 135.5 217.6 0.621 905.0 174.4 0.047 
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Table 5.  The IV estimates of the linear probability model of survival 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
            
Instrumented Di  0.0951*** 0.0868** 0.0912** 0.0880** 0.0903** 
  (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Lagged visiting customers --- 0.0362 0.0309 0.0346 0.0337 
    (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Lagged record keeping --- 0.0905** 0.0884** 0.0911** 0.0896** 
    (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lagged record analysis --- -0.0248 -0.0359 -0.0316 -0.0349 
    (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Lagged sales revenue --- --- -0.0003 --- --- 
     (0.000)   
Lagged value added --- --- --- -0.0002 --- 
      (0.000)  
Lagged gross profit --- --- --- --- -0.0005 
       (0.000) 
Machinist  0.0209 0.0048 0.0185 0.0140 0.0200 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) 
Age 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
From Ashanti -0.0272 -0.0227 -0.0225 -0.0210 -0.0201 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Years of schooling -0.0184* -0.0205* -0.0178* -0.0193* -0.0183* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Apprentice training -0.0246 -0.0251 -0.0210 -0.0244 -0.0249 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
Years of operation 0.0017 0.0019 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.9840*** 0.9731*** 0.9927*** 0.9844*** 0.9943*** 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.121) (0.122) (0.117) 
R-squared 0.103 0.130 0.138 0.132 0.135 
Notes.   
The dependent variable is unity if the firm was operating at the time of the follow-up survey and 
zero otherwise.  The number of observations is 119.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   
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Table 6.  The IV estimates of the training effects on the participants in the larger sample (ANCOVA) 
  
Visiting customers 
(i) 
Record keeping 
(ii) 
Record analysis 
(iii) 
Sales revenue 
(iv) 
Value added 
(v) 
Gross profit  
(vi) 
Instrumented Di  0.2442*** 0.3543*** 0.4220*** 11.3451 8.9618 4.2305 
  (0.067) (0.071) (0.069) (13.602) (8.190) (7.835) 
Average lagged Yi 0.8268*** 0.7372*** 0.8185*** 0.2247 0.0504 0.0634 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.064) (0.150) (0.076) (0.096) 
Machinist 0.0515 -0.1336* -0.0832 3.8699 16.3252** 13.9937* 
 (0.065) (0.071) (0.066) (11.210) (7.431) (7.183) 
Foundry 0.0463 0.2356** 0.1575 20.8639 23.5250 6.4294 
 (0.092) (0.110) (0.099) (41.747) (18.849) (17.765) 
Age -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.9824** -0.7391** -0.6837** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.499) (0.310) (0.308) 
From Ashanti 0.0901 0.2317*** 0.1904*** -18.2328 -9.1312 -9.7587 
 (0.071) (0.062) (0.065) (21.287) (13.129) (12.619) 
Years of schooling 0.0127* -0.0004 -0.0034 -5.7568** -2.6470 -2.5289 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (2.719) (1.818) (1.831) 
Apprentice training 0.0157 -0.1306 -0.0275 -19.9928 -12.6750 -13.8110 
 (0.079) (0.099) (0.084) (21.403) (17.657) (17.924) 
Years of operation 0.0040 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.3699 -0.2386 -0.1934 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.549) (0.288) (0.275) 
Intercept -0.1174 0.2585 0.0920 161.2306*** 93.3041** 89.9934** 
 (0.177) (0.217) (0.198) (60.084) (43.315) (44.054) 
R-squared 0.503 0.474 0.518 0.194 0.174 0.127 
Notes.  The number of observations is 139.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   
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Table 7.  The IV estimates of the training effects on the participants in the smaller sample (ANCOVA) 
  
Visiting customers
(i) 
Record keeping 
(ii) 
Record analysis 
(iii) 
Sales revenue 
(iv) 
Value added 
(v) 
Gross profit  
(vi) 
       
Instrumented Di  0.2861*** 0.3703*** 0.3944*** 17.8675 13.8858* 13.4647* 
  (0.084) (0.080) (0.081) (12.208) (8.339) (7.974) 
R-squared 0.496 0.534 0.540 0.140 0.145 0.134 
       
Heterogeneous effects       
 (1) line of business       
  Instrumented Di   0.2254* 0.5527*** 0.4507*** 16.4637 8.9997 9.6859 
 (0.126) (0.141) (0.137) (14.111) (9.079) (8.987) 
  Instrumented (machinist ×Di)  0.099 -0.300* -0.093 2.318 8.052 6.242 
 (0.159) (0.176) (0.174) (21.551) (14.916) (14.404) 
       
 (2) age       
  Instrumented Di   0.7521** 0.4705 0.9757*** 40.2946 49.1621 49.6076 
 (0.338) (0.339) (0.298) (63.628) (38.980) (37.765) 
  Instrumented (age × Di)   -0.0106 -0.0023 -0.0132* -0.5085 -0.8012 -0.8201 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (1.298) (0.737) (0.714) 
       
 (3) years of schooling       
  Instrumented Di -0.2289 -0.3797 -0.3419 66.8643* 45.1309* 49.6244** 
    (0.242) (0.410) (0.375) (38.697) (23.470) (22.966) 
  Instrumented (schooling ×Di)    0.0507** 0.0735* 0.0722** -4.8034 -3.0635* -3.5459* 
    (0.023) (0.040) (0.036) (3.216) (1.853) (1.832) 
Notes.  The number of observations is 113.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Although not reported here, these regressions 
controlled for the machinist dummy, age of the entrepreneur, the Ashanti dummy, years of schooling, experience of apprentice training, and 
the number of years of operation of the firm. 
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Table 8.  Bounds for the IV estimates of the effect of the training program on the participants (ANCOVA) 
  
Visiting customers 
(i) 
Record keeping 
(ii) 
Record analysis 
(iii) 
Sales revenue 
(iv) 
Value added 
(v) 
Gross profit  
(vi) 
             
Approach I        
Lower bound 0.0560 0.1587* 0.1558* -10.5153 -3.5338 -4.6008 
    (0.092) (0.086) (0.090) (13.736) (9.081) (8.958) 
   Upper bound 0.3226*** 0.4187*** 0.4210*** 27.9109** 18.7591** 17.9136** 
    (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (12.848) (8.268) (8.048) 
       
Approach II       
Lower bound 0.2444*** 0.3184*** 0.3507*** 18.6051 13.1175 12.9273 
    (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (12.682) (8.196) (7.986) 
   Upper bound 0.2969*** 0.3758*** 0.4008*** 22.8463* 15.3746* 15.0786* 
    (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (12.726) (8.205) (7.997) 
       
Approach III       
Lower bound 0.2602*** 0.3356*** 0.3657*** 19.8774 13.7946* 13.5727* 
    (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (12.690) (8.195) (7.986) 
   Upper bound 0.2812*** 0.3586*** 0.3858*** 21.5740* 14.6974* 14.4333* 
    (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (12.707) (8.199) (7.991) 
Notes.   
The number of observations is 136 for the bounds analyses.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Although not reported here, these regressions 
controlled for the machinist dummy, age of the entrepreneur, the Ashanti dummy, years of schooling, experience of apprentice training, and the 
number of years of operation of the firm. 
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